

Reasoning

<http://compcogscisydney.org/psyc207/>

Danielle Navarro




- Deductive reasoning
- Inductive reasoning
- Informal reasoning



“WE talk of man* being the rational animal; and the traditional intellectualist philosophy has always made a great point of treating the brutes as wholly irrational creatures.


Nevertheless, it is by no means easy to decide just what is meant by reason”

- William James (1890)



Reasoning, logic and truth

Aristotle




... and the
peripatetics

Philo



... and the
dialecticians

Zeno



... and the
stoics

- How is the truth of a claim established?
- What should we believe?
- Are there rules we should follow?
- What are these rules?
- (And do we follow them?)

Kinds of reasoning

Deductive
reasoning



Using facts to
reach a “logically
certain” conclusion

Kinds of reasoning

Deductive
reasoning




Using facts to
reach a “logically
certain” conclusion

Inductive
reasoning



Using facts to
reach a “plausible”
conclusion (allows
room for doubt)

Part I: Deductive reasoning




“Syllogisms” are a
tool for formalising
arguments

All men* are mortal
Socrates is a man

Therefore, Socrates is mortal

(* With very sincere apologies to everyone for the sexist framing here – this specific phrasing has a long history)

The major premise
states a general rule



All men* are mortal

Socrates is a man

Therefore, Socrates is mortal

The major premise
states a general rule

The minor premise
states a specific fact

All men* are mortal

Socrates is a man

Therefore, Socrates is mortal

The major premise
states a general rule

The minor premise
states a specific fact

All men* are mortal
Socrates is a man

Therefore, Socrates is mortal

The conclusion is the statement
we are asked to accept

A slight variation on
this argument


If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal
Socrates is a man

Therefore, Socrates is mortal

Major premise:

Antecedent: "Socrates is a man"

Consequent: "Socrates is mortal"



If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal

Socrates is a man

Therefore, Socrates is mortal

Major premise:

Antecedent: "Socrates is a man"

Consequent: "Socrates is mortal"



If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal
Socrates is a man

Therefore, Socrates is mortal



No changes to the minor
premise or the conclusion

If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal

Socrates is a man



“Affirming” evidence refers to a fact (in the minor premise) that agrees with the major premise in some sense

If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal
Socrates is NOT a man



“Denying” evidence refers to a fact (in the minor premise) that disagrees with the major premise in some sense

- Valid arguments:

- Conclusion is *necessarily* true if the premises are true
- i.e., it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false (at the same time)



Valid argument by affirmation...

(positive evidence)

	Affirms	Denies
Antecedent	“Modus ponens” 	Denying the antecedent
Consequent	Affirming the consequent	“Modus tollens”

Modus ponens

(“the way that affirms”)

If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal

Socrates is a man

Therefore, Socrates is mortal

← Minor premise asserts
that the antecedent of the
major premise is TRUE


Modus ponens

(“the way that affirms”)

If **Socrates is a man**, then **he is mortal**

Socrates is a man

Therefore, Socrates is mortal




This Venn diagram describes the structure of the major premise (*sort of)

Modus ponens


(“the way that affirms”)

If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal
Socrates is a man

Therefore, Socrates is mortal



It's impossible to put the x inside the “man circle” and outside the “mortal circle”




Modus ponens

("the way that affirms")

If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal
Socrates is a man

Therefore, Socrates is mortal



Valid argument by denial...

(negative evidence)

	Affirms	Denies
Antecedent	"Modus ponens"	Denying the antecedent
Consequent	Affirming the consequent	"Modus tollens" 

Modus tollens

(“the way that denies”)

If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal
Socrates is a NOT a mortal

Therefore, Socrates is NOT a man


← Minor premise asserts that
the consequent of the
major premise is FALSE

Modus tollens

(“the way that denies”)

If **Socrates is a man**, then **he is mortal**
Socrates is a NOT a mortal

Therefore, Socrates is NOT a man



If Socrates is outside the mortal circle, then “he” can’t be inside the man circle




Modus tollens

("the way that denies")

If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal
Socrates is a NOT a mortal

Therefore, Socrates is NOT a man



- Valid arguments:

- Conclusion is *necessarily* true if the premises are true
- i.e., it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false (at the same time)



- Invalid arguments:

- Conclusion *might* be true, but it is not guaranteed by the premises
- i.e., it is *possible* for the premises to be true but the conclusion can still be false



Invalid argument by affirmation...

	Affirms	Denies
Antecedent	“Modus ponens”	Denying the antecedent
Consequent	Affirming the consequent 	“Modus tollens”


Affirming the consequent

If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal
Socrates is mortal

Therefore, Socrates is a man?

← Minor premise asserts that
the consequent of the
major premise is TRUE

Affirming the consequent




If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal
Socrates is mortal

Therefore, Socrates is a man?



This is invalid because there are other things that are mortal without being men

Socrates



Invalid argument by denial...

	Affirms	Denies
Antecedent	“Modus ponens”	Denying the antecedent 
Consequent	Affirming the consequent	“Modus tollens”

Denial of the antecedent

If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal
Socrates is a NOT a man

Therefore, Socrates is NOT a mortal?

← Minor premise asserts that
the antecedent of the
major premise is FALSE


Denial of the antecedent

If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal
Socrates is a NOT a man

Therefore, Socrates is NOT a mortal?



As before... we have a mortal that is not a man



Minor premise AFFIRMS...

Minor premise DENIES...

**Modus
Ponens (MP)**

If P, then Q
P

Therefore, Q

**Denying the
Antecedent (DA)**

If P, then Q
not P

Therefore, not Q

... the
ANTECEDENT

**Affirming the
Consequent (AC)**

If P, then Q
Q

Therefore, P

**Modus
Tollens (MT)**

If P, then Q
not Q


Therefore, not P

... the
CONSEQUENT

Do people follow these
deductive rules?




Barrouillet et al (2000)



Adults are good with arguments about the **ANTECEDENT**


Barrouillet et al (2000)



We're not so sure what to do when the argument pertains to the **CONSEQUENT**

Barrouillet et al (2000)

Kids assume that **AFFIRMATORY** arguments are correct?



Wason's (1968) selection task

Rule: If there is an R on one side of the card, then there is a 2 on the other



Wason's (1968) selection task

Rule: If there is an R on one side of the card, then there is a 2 on the other



Does this need to be turned?

Wason's (1968) selection task

Rule: If there is an R on one side of the card, then there is a 2 on the other



Does this need to be turned?

Wason's (1968) selection task

Rule: If there is an R on one side of the card, then there is a 2 on the other



Does this need to be turned?

Wason's (1968) selection task

Rule: If there is an R on one side of the card, then there is a 2 on the other



Does this need to be turned?

Rule: If there is an R on one side of the card, then there is a 2 on the other



ANTECEDENT

CONSEQUENT

If people solved the problem using deductive reasoning...

“If R then 2”

Modus ponens

Modus tollens




ANTECEDENT

CONSEQUENT

AFFIRM



DENY

NOPE... people use a *positive test strategy**, selecting the two cards that “affirm” the rule



* More traditionally called “confirmation bias” but this terminology is misleading

Aside: note the **similarity** between adults and kids...



... humans ***like*** positive evidence
(there's a good reason for this, btw)

People are better at deontic versions of the selection task

Indicative rule

- *if this then that*
- “On Monday I wear black”

People are better at deontic versions of the selection task

Indicative rule

- *if this then that*
- “On Monday I wear black”

Deontic rule

- *if this then you should that*
- “On Monday you MUST wear black”

Whose ID needs to be checked?

Minor drinking
SOMETHING



Whose ID needs to be checked?

Minor drinking
SOMETHING



Adult drinking
SOMETHING



Whose ID needs to be checked?

Minor drinking
SOMETHING



Adult drinking
SOMETHING



SOMEONE
drinking tea



Whose ID needs to be checked?

Minor drinking
SOMETHING



Adult drinking
SOMETHING



SOMEONE
drinking tea



SOMEONE
drinking beer



Whose ID needs to be checked?

Minor drinking
SOMETHING



↑
**Modus
ponens**

Adult drinking
SOMETHING



SOMEONE
drinking tea



SOMEONE
drinking beer




↑
**Modus
tollens**


Mini-summary

- Logical reasoning
 - Definitions of deductive and inductive reasoning
 - Syllogisms and how they work
 - Definitions of valid and invalid reasoning
 - Four argument types: MP, MT, DA and DC
- Empirical evidence
 - Developmental changes?
 - Wason selection task
 - Indicative vs deontic versions


Part 2: Inductive reasoning




Socrates
was mortal



Aristotle
was mortal



Cicero
was mortal




Augustus
was mortal




All humans
are mortal?


Inductive arguments rely on limited evidence to make a (general or specific) conclusion seem more *plausible*



Socrates
was mortal



Aristotle
was mortal




Cicero
was mortal




Augustus
was mortal




All humans
are mortal?




Socrates
was white



Aristotle
was white



Cicero
was white





Augustus
was white



All humans
are white.
And male?
And statues?

It... um... doesn't always work

(FYI, we've seen inductive reasoning
in the last lecture...)



“Generalising from
one stimulus to
another is an act
of induction”



Inductive arguments


Dolphins express the TH4 gene

Seals express the TH4 gene



Dolphins → Seals

Argument strength =
do the premises make
the conclusion feel
more believable?



Which feels stronger?



Dolphins → Seals




Dolphins → Mice



Dolphins → Seals




Dolphins → Mice



Premise-conclusion similarity

(Osherson et al 1990)



People are more willing to endorse an inductive argument when the premise and conclusion items are similar

Which feels stronger?

Dolphins + **Seals** → Cows



Dolphins + **Mice** → Cows



Premise diversity



(Osherson et al 1990)

People are more willing to endorse an inductive argument when the premises are dissimilar

Dolphins + Seals → Cows



Dolphins + **Mice** → Cows



Which feels stronger?

Dolphins → Cows



Dolphins + **Mice** → Cows




Premise monotonicity



(Osherson et al 1990)

People are more willing to make inductive generalisations when they have more examples!

Dolphins → Cows



Dolphins + **Mice** → Cows



Mini-summary

- Difference between induction and deduction
- Phenomena in inductive reasoning
 - Premise-conclusion similarity
 - Premise diversity
 - Premise monotonicity

Part 3:
Fallacies & informal reasoning

Propositional fallacies [\[edit \]](#)

A propositional fallacy is an error in logic that concerns compound propositions. For a compound proposition to be true, the truth values of its constituent parts must satisfy the relevant logical connectives that occur in it (most commonly: <and>, <or>, <not>, <only if>, <if and only if>). The following fallacies involve inferences whose correctness is not guaranteed by the behavior of those logical connectives, and hence, which are not logically guaranteed to yield true conclusions.

Types of propositional fallacies:

- **Affirming a disjunct** – concluding that one disjunct of a logical disjunction must be false because the other disjunct is true; *A or B; A, therefore not B.* ^[1]
- **Affirming the consequent** – the antecedent in an indicative conditional is claimed to be true because the consequent is true; *if A, then B; B, therefore A.* ^[2]
- **Denying the antecedent** – the consequent in an indicative conditional is claimed to be false because the antecedent is false; *if A, then B; not A, therefore not B.* ^[3]

Some “reasoning fallacies” occur because people fail to follow deductive logic... as we saw earlier in the lecture

Informal fallacies [\[edit\]](#)

Main article: *Informal fallacy*

Informal fallacies – arguments that are fallacious for reasons other than structural (formal) flaws and usually require examination of the argument's content.^[12]

- **Appeal to the stone** (*arguerum ad lapidem*) – dismissing a claim as absurd without demonstrating proof for its absurdity.^[13]
- **Argument from ignorance** (*appes' ignorantia*, *argumentum ad ignorantiam*) – assuming that a claim is true because it has not been or cannot be proven false, or vice versa.^[14]
- **Argument from (personal) incredulity** (*Wine fallacy*, *appeal to common sense*) – assuming that something is true because one must be able to understand it, or that something is false because one cannot understand it.^{[15][16]}
- **Argument from repetition** (*argumentum ad nauseam*, *argumentum ad nauseam*) – assuming that a claim is true because it has been repeated so often that nobody cares to discuss it anymore.^{[17][18]} sometimes confused with the *bandwagon fallacy*.
- **Argument from silence** (*argumentum ex silentio*) – where the conclusion is drawn from a lack of evidence.^{[19][20]}
- **Argument to moderation** (*false compromise*, *middle ground*, *fallacy of the mean*) – assuming that a compromise between two positions is always correct.^[21]
- **Argumentum ad hominem** – the evasion of the actual topic by directing an attack at your opponent.
 - *ergo decedo* – where a critic's perceived affiliation is seen as the underlying reason for the criticism and the critic is asked to stay away from the issue altogether.
- **Argumentum verbosium** - See Proof by verbosity, below.
- **Begging the question** (*petitio principii*) – providing what is essentially the conclusion of the argument as a premise.^{[22][23][24][25]}
- **Shifting the burden of proof** (see – *onus probandi*) – I need not prove my claim, you must prove it is false.
- **Circular reasoning** (*circulus in demonstrando*) – when the reasoner begins with what he or she is trying to end up with; sometimes called *assuming the conclusion*.
- **Circular cause and consequence** – where the consequence of the phenomenon is claimed to be its root cause.
- **Continuum fallacy** (*fallacy of the beard*, *line-drawing fallacy*, *sorites fallacy*, *fallacy of the heap*, *bald man fallacy*) – improperly rejecting a claim for being imprecise.^[26]

Other reasoning fallacies occur because there's something not-quite-right with their content

Informal fallacies [\[edit\]](#)

Main article: *informal fallacy*

Informal fallacies – arguments that are fallacious for reasons other than structural (formal) flaws and usually require examination of the argument's content.^[12]

- **Appeal to the stone** (argumentum ad lapidem) – dismissing a claim as absurd without demonstrating proof for its absurdity.^[13]
- **Argument from ignorance** (appes' to ignorance, argumentum ad ignorantiam) – assuming that a claim is true because it has not been or cannot be proven false, or vice versa.^[14]
- **Argument from (personal) incredulity** (X-vine fallacy, appeal to common sense) – assuming that a claim is true because it is not obvious to you that it must be false.^{[15][16]}
- **Argument from repetition** (argumentum ad nauseam, argumentum ad nauseam) – assuming that a claim is true because nobody cares to discuss it anymore;^{[17][18]} sometimes confused with
- **Argument from silence** (argumentum ex silentio) – where the conclusion is drawn from a lack of evidence.^{[19][20]}
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 - *ergo decedo* – where a critic's perceived animosity is seen as the underlying reason for the criticism and the critic is asked to stay away from the issue altogether.
- **Argumentum verbosium** - See Proof by verbosity, below.
- **Begging the question** (petitio principii) – providing what is essentially the conclusion of the argument as a premise.^{[22][23][24][25]}
- **Shifting the burden of proof** (see – onus probandi) – I need not prove my claim, you must prove it is false.
- **Circular reasoning** (circular argument, demonstrando) – when the reasoner begins with what he or she is trying to end up with; sometimes called assuming the conclusion.
- **Circular cause and consequence** – where the consequence of the phenomenon is claimed to be its root cause.
- **Continuum fallacy** (fallacy of the beard, line-drawing fallacy, sorites fallacy, fallacy of the heap, bald man fallacy) – improperly rejecting a claim for being imprecise.^[26]

We'll focus on some of the empirical evidence about how these two work

Arguments from ignorance

“Claiming that X must be true just because you can't prove that X is false”

“Ghosts exist... because there is no proof that they do not”



This is also an argument from ignorance



“Ghosts exist... because there is no proof that they do not”



“There’s no Hatfield stop in Sydney ... because it’s not on the Metro map”





Structure of the ghosts argument

If ghosts don't exist, there should be proof of their impossibility

There is no proof of the impossibility of ghosts

Therefore, ghosts exist



Structure of the trains argument

If Hatfield exists, it should be listed on the Metro map

It is not listed on the Metro map

Therefore, Hatfield does not exist

These are both deductively valid

If A then B

Not B

Therefore, not A

→ Modus tollens



A = ghosts exist

B = proof that ghosts are impossible




A = the Hatfield stop exists

B = Hatfield is listed on the Metro map

Epistemic closure (“closed world”)

The Sydney metro map is *epistemically closed*: it is presumed to be a complete representation of the train network



No Hatfield on the map is very strong evidence that there is no Hatfield in world

Epistemic closure (“closed world”)

The scientific literature on ghosts is NOT epistemically closed: there are true facts not in scientific journals!



← The fact that no-one has *proved* ghosts impossible is not very strong evidence *for* the existence of ghosts

Another example

Jon Snow can't remember a day when it was 50 degrees in Sydney... therefore the temperature in Sydney has never reached 50 in living memory



← “Um... you're a fictional character and basically an idiot”

Another example

Jon Snow can't remember a day when it was 50 degrees in Sydney... therefore the temperature in Sydney has never reached 50 in living memory





← “Um... you're a fictional character and basically an idiot”

The Bureau of Meteorology has never recorded a temperature of 50 degrees in Sydney ... therefore the temperature in Sydney has never reached 50 in living memory




↑ “We have extensive & detailed records of Sydney weather for over a century”





X

If BoM doesn't know of a 50 degree day, there probably wasn't one




X

There's no reason to care what Jon Snow thinks


Do people respect the inductive strength of an argument from ignorance?

I [strongly / weakly] believe that this drug [does / does not] have side effects because [one / fifty] experiments reported it


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Circular arguments

“Assuming that X is true in order to prove that X is true”


Circular arguments

God exists because the Bible says so,
and the Bible is the word of God



Circular arguments


God exists because the Bible says so,
and the Bible is the word of God



Inductive reasoning is justified because
it has worked in the past, so it will
work in the future

Circular arguments

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


Inductive reasoning is justified because
it has worked in the past, so it will
work in the future


Electrons exist because we can see 3-
cm tracks in a cloud chamber, and 3-cm
tracks in a cloud chamber are the
signatures of electrons




Hm.



There is a white triangle because it is blocking the black circles and the black triangle... and we assume there's a black triangle and black circles because there's a white triangle blocking them




Constraint satisfaction, simplicity ... and circularity?




The simplicity and figural goodness properties of layer 1 provide evidence for the existence of layer 2, and vice versa ... mutually reinforcing

Constraint satisfaction, simplicity ... and circularity?




The simplicity and figural goodness properties of layer 1 provide evidence for the existence of layer 2, and vice versa ... mutually reinforcing



I suppose this is possible but if that's the best alternative hypothesis I'm going to go with the circular one!

Circular arguments are often an implicit appeal to an explanatory “system”

Christianity \Rightarrow God + Bible



The subjective “strength” of circular arguments depends on how strongly you accept the “system” as an explanation for a larger body of facts

Physics \Rightarrow Experiments + Theory



	mass \rightarrow +2.3 MeV/c ² charge \rightarrow 2/3 spin \rightarrow 1/2 u up	mass \rightarrow +1.275 GeV/c ² charge \rightarrow 2/3 spin \rightarrow 1/2 c charm	mass \rightarrow +173.07 GeV/c ² charge \rightarrow 2/3 spin \rightarrow 1/2 t top	mass \rightarrow 0 charge \rightarrow 0 spin \rightarrow 1 g gluon	mass \rightarrow +126 GeV/c ² charge \rightarrow 0 spin \rightarrow 0 H Higgs boson	
QUARKS	mass \rightarrow +4.8 MeV/c ² charge \rightarrow -1/3 spin \rightarrow 1/2 d down	mass \rightarrow +95 MeV/c ² charge \rightarrow -1/3 spin \rightarrow 1/2 s strange	mass \rightarrow +4.18 GeV/c ² charge \rightarrow -1/3 spin \rightarrow 1/2 b bottom	mass \rightarrow 0 charge \rightarrow 0 spin \rightarrow 1 γ photon		
	mass \rightarrow 0.511 MeV/c ² charge \rightarrow -1 spin \rightarrow 1/2 e electron	mass \rightarrow 105.7 MeV/c ² charge \rightarrow -1 spin \rightarrow 1/2 μ muon	mass \rightarrow 1.777 GeV/c ² charge \rightarrow -1 spin \rightarrow 1/2 τ tau	mass \rightarrow 91.2 GeV/c ² charge \rightarrow 0 spin \rightarrow 1 Z Z boson	GAUGE BOSONS	
	mass \rightarrow <2.2 eV/c ² charge \rightarrow 0 spin \rightarrow 1/2 ν_e electron neutrino	mass \rightarrow <0.17 MeV/c ² charge \rightarrow 0 spin \rightarrow 1/2 ν_μ muon neutrino	mass \rightarrow +15.5 MeV/c ² charge \rightarrow 0 spin \rightarrow 1/2 ν_τ tau neutrino	mass \rightarrow 80.4 GeV/c ² charge \rightarrow +1 spin \rightarrow 1 W W boson		

Hahn & Oaksford (2007)

John: I think there's a thunderstorm

Anne: What makes you think that?

John: I just heard a loud noise that could have been thunder

Anne: That could have been an airplane

John: I think it was thunder, because I think it's a thunderstorm

Anne: Well, it has been really muggy around here today

Hahn & Oaksford (2007)

- John:* I think there's a thunderstorm
Anne: What makes you think that?
John: I just heard a loud noise that could have been thunder
Anne: That could have been an airplane
John: I think it was thunder, because I think it's a thunderstorm
Anne: Well, it has been really muggy around here today

Alternative is low plausibility:

“John and Anne are in their camper van at their woodland campsite”



Alternative is high plausibility:

“John and Anne are in their trailer home near the airport”



People rate John's circular argument as more *convincing* when the alternative explanation is less plausible

Alternative is low plausibility:

“John and Anne are in their camper van at their woodland campsite”



Alternative is high plausibility:

“John and Anne are in their trailer home near the airport”




Mini-summary

- “Rational” explanations of fallacies?
- Examples:
 - Argument from ignorance (epistemic closure)
 - Circular arguments (appeal to explanatory system)


It is by no means easy to decide just
what is meant by reason

- William James (1890)



It is by no means easy to decide just what is meant by reason

- William James (1890)



When is “argument from ignorance” a fallacy and when is it wise?



When is an “inductive inference” warranted and when is it silly?



Are people *really* doing the selection task “wrong”?

R

G

2

7

Let it snow!

